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Ascertaining the Proper Law of an Arbitration
Agreement: The Artificiality of Inferring Intention
When There Is None
Darius CHAN* & Teo JIM YANG**
The common law choice of law principles for determining the proper law of an arbitration
agreement previously thought to be settled by the English Court of Appeal’s decision in
Sulamérica v. Enesa [2013] 1 W.L.R. 102 have now been thrown into disarray after a recent
string of three judgments: starting with the Singapore Court of Appeal’s decision in BNA v.
BNB [2019] S.G.C.A. 84, followed by two decisions from the English Court of Appeal in
Kabab-Ji v. Kout Food Group [2020] EWCA Civ 6 and Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi A.S. v.
OOO ‘Insurance Company Chubb’ [2020] EWCA Civ 574.
This article undertakes a comparative analysis of English and Singapore case law and
argues that the common law should take party autonomy more seriously by ascertaining whether
the parties have a clear and real intent to choose a particular system of law to govern their
arbitration agreement. The current reliance on presumptions or inferences of what the parties must
have intended is in reality an artificial arrogation to judges and arbitrators on what ‘commercial’
sensibilities businessmen should be taken to have. In the absence of a clear and real intent,
arbitrators and state signatories to the New York Convention ought to apply the law of the seat
as the default choice of law rule in the New York Convention.
Keywords: governing law, proper law, arbitration agreement, choice of law, conflict of laws,
Sulamérica, Kabab-Ji, Enka, BNA, separability, validation principle, Article V(1)(a), New York
Convention.
1 INTRODUCTION
Over five months, the common law world has seen three decisions – one from the
Singapore Court of Appeal and two from the English Court of Appeal – taking
differing positions to ascertain the proper law of an arbitration agreement, with the
latter two English decisions departing from what was arguably thought to be settled
law following Sulamérica v. Enesa.1
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1 Sulamérica CIA Nacional de Seguros S.A. & ors v. Enesa Engenharia S.A. & ors [2013] 1 W.L.R. 102.
Sulamérica took the common-sensical view that the proper law of an arbitra-
tion agreement is determined under established common law choice-of-law rules
as with any contract: the court must give effect to the parties’ choice of proper law,
express or implied, failing which the system of law with which the contract has the
closest and most real connection will then be identified. The English Court of
Appeal observed that while parties commonly make an express choice of law to
govern their contract, it is unusual for them to make an express choice of law to
govern any arbitration agreement contained within it; and where they have not
done so, the natural inference is that they intended the proper law chosen to
govern the substantive contract to also govern the agreement to arbitrate.2
However, this inference was displaced in Sulamérica because there was at least a
serious risk that the proper law chosen to govern the substantive
contract – Brazilian law – would render the arbitration agreement invalid. The
court ultimately applied English law on the basis that, as the system of law at the
chosen seat of arbitration, it had the closest and most real connection with the
arbitration agreement.3
Recently, in Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi A.S. v. OOO ‘Insurance Company Chubb’,4
the English Court of Appeal turned the Sulamérica presumption on its head,
holding that in the absence of express choice, there is a strong presumption that
the parties have impliedly chosen the law of the seat of arbitration as the law governing
the arbitration agreement. This mirrors ironically the Singapore decision of
FirstLink Investments Corp. Ltd. v. GT Payment Pte. Ltd.5 back in 2014, which
was subsequently overruled in a series of decisions – culminating in the Singapore
Court of Appeal decision of BNA v. BNB6 – that endorsed the Sulamérica
approach.
2 BNA: THE RELEVANCE OF A GOVERNING LAW’S
INVALIDATING EFFECT
BNA provides a fascinating example where, though the test in Sulamérica was
purportedly applied, the outcome was opposite from that in Sulamérica. The
arbitration agreement provided for ‘arbitration in Shanghai’ administered by
the Singapore International Arbitration Centre (SIAC), but did not itself contain
any express indication of governing law. Influenced by the arbitration agree-
ment’s apparent invalidity under the laws of the People’s Republic of China
2 Ibid., para. 11.
3 Ibid., paras 30–32.
4 Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi A.S. v. OOO ‘Insurance Company Chubb’ & ors [2020] EWCA Civ 574.
5 FirstLink Investments Corp. Ltd. v. GT Payment Pte. Ltd. [2014] S.G.H.C.R. 12.
6 BNA v. BNB [2019] S.G.C.A. 84.
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(PRC)7 which expressly governed the main contract, both the majority arbitra-
tors and the Singapore High Court concluded that the parties must have intended
to seat the arbitration in Singapore, and subject the arbitration agreement to
Singapore law. The Singapore Court of Appeal reversed, applying a presumption
that the parties intended the proper law expressly chosen to govern the sub-
stantive contract – PRC law – to govern the arbitration agreement, despite the
outcome of invalidity.8 The court rightly found that ‘arbitration in Shanghai’
meant that Shanghai was the arbitral seat.9 Since the law of the seat was not
materially different from the law governing the main contract, the presumption
that PRC law governed the arbitration agreement was not displaced.
BNA was an easy case insofar as most connecting factors pointed to the PRC,
with the only connection to Singapore being the express choice of SIAC as the
arbitral institution. In these circumstances, one can appreciate the tenuous link
Singapore law had with the arbitration agreement. Suppose instead the arbitration
agreement in BNA expressly provided for arbitration seated in Singapore. This
moves us squarely into Sulamérica territory, where the law of the seat had the
advantage of ensuring the validity of the arbitration agreement, as opposed to the
law governing the main contract. Critically, the Singapore Court of Appeal in
BNA emphasized that the potential invalidating effects of any governing law are
only relevant where the parties were at least aware of those consequences, which
was not the case on the available evidence.10 This imparts a uniquely Singaporean
flavour to the Sulamérica test. In Sulamérica, there was no indication that the parties
were aware of the potential invalidity of the arbitration agreement under Brazilian
law. Rather, the English Court of Appeal found that the parties could not have
intended to choose Brazilian law to invalidate their arbitration agreement.11
This Singaporean gloss is interesting considering that the judge who delivered
the judgment in BNA, Steven Chong, J.A., had, sitting as a High Court judge in
BCY v. BCZ, earlier endorsed the proposition in Sulamérica that the governing law
of the main contract could be displaced if it would effectively negate the parties’
clear intention to arbitrate.12 BNA also implicitly rejects the teleological reasoning
of the validation principle advanced by Gary Born, i.e. that a court should give
effect to a governing law that would ensure the validity of the agreement to
arbitrate.13 At its core, BNA neatly showcases how the Singapore court strives to
7 See generally Hee Theng Fong, Arbitration in China and Singapore, SAL Practitioner 28 (2019).
8 BNA v. BNB [2019] S.G.C.A. 84, para. 62.
9 Ibid., para. 102.
10 Ibid., para. 90.
11 Sulamérica Cia Nacional de Seguros, supra n. 1, para. 32.
12 BCY v. BCZ [2017] 3 S.L.R. 357, para. 74.
13 Gary Born, The Law Governing International Arbitration Agreements: An International Perspective, 26 SAcLJ
814–848 (2014).
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ascertain the parties’ actual intentions while staving off judicial imputations dis-
guised as implied party intent, a theme which we will return to.
3 KABAB-JI AND ENKA: THE RELEVANCE OF SEPARABILITY FOR
THE PROPER LAW OF AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT
Moving back to England, what followed BNA was Kabab-Ji S.A.L. v. Kout Food
Group.14 The main contract was a franchise agreement expressly governed by English
law, but there was no explicit choice of law in the arbitration clause, which instead
provided for ‘arbitration … in Paris, France’ administered under the International
Chamber of Commerce Rules of Arbitration. In the judgment delivered by Flaux, L.J.
(with whom Sir Bernard Rix and McCombe, L.J. concurred), much attention was
placed on the words used in the governing law clause of the contract: it stipulated that
‘[t]his Agreement shall be governed by [English law]’ (emphasis added) and the same
capitalized phrase ‘[t]his Agreement’ was defined in the main contract to include all
terms of agreement. Although the court carefully acknowledged that not all governing
law clauses in a contract would necessarily extend to the arbitration clause, in its view
the governing law clause in Kabab-Ji should be properly construed as an express choice
of English law for all provisions of the contract including the arbitration clause.15
Applying English law, the English Court of Appeal refused enforcement of the arbitral
award in question on the basis that the non-signatory respondent was not a proper
party to the arbitration agreement.
Kabab-Ji’s approach can be usefully contrasted against an earlier Singaporean
approach in BCY, where Chong, J. (as he then was), just stopping short of finding
an express choice, preferred the view that the governing law clause in the main
contract was a ‘strong indicator’ of the governing law of the arbitration agreement
because it referred to the ‘agreement’, whose ordinary meaning was a reference to
all provisions in the contract including the arbitration clause.16 On this premise the
choice of governing law in the main contract constitutes an implied choice of the
governing law of the arbitration agreement. Indeed, it has been pointed out that a
general choice of law clause using the language of ‘this agreement’ as in Kabab-Ji
and BCY is ambivalent at best – it can be interpreted as the contractual document
and the terms contained therein, including the arbitration clause, or as the legal
concept of a contract which the parties understood, as distinct from the arbitration
agreement under the doctrine of separability.17
14 Kabab-Ji S.A.L. (Kuwait) v. Kout Food Group (Lebanon) [2020] EWCA Civ 6.
15 Ibid., para. 62.
16 BCY v. BCZ [2017] 3 S.L.R. 357, para. 59.
17 Myron Phua, An Ameliorative Interpretation of Sulamerica, LCMLQ 203–210, 210 (2020).
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Insofar as implied choice is concerned, Kabab-Ji suggested that the business
efficacy test under English contract law for implying terms in fact was applicable to
ascertaining an implied choice of law for an arbitration agreement.18 This is likely
obiter but one could speculate whether the court’s readiness to find an express
choice was driven by a desire to avoid the rigours of the business efficacy test that
was thought to exist under an implied choice route. More importantly, one would
wonder whether the court would have construed the express choice of law
provision in the same way if, as in Sulamérica or BNA, the provision stipulated a
governing law that could potentially invalidate the arbitration agreement.
Enka arrived shortly after Kabab-Ji, and the stage was set for Enka to elaborate on
precisely how the business efficacy test would apply when ascertaining an implied choice
of law. However, any such expectations were thwarted. In Enka, the claimant (‘Enka’)
had subcontracted for certain works relating to a power plant construction project in
Russia. The subcontract contained an agreement to refer all disputes to arbitration seated
in London, but unlike as in BNA and Kabab-Ji, contained no express choice of law for
both the subcontract and the arbitration clause therein. A fire at the power plant caused
significant damage, for which the power plant owner managed to recover under its
insurance policy with the first defendant (‘Chubb Russia’). Despite the arbitration
agreement, Chubb Russia commenced proceedings in Moscow against Enka and ten
co-defendants (the ‘Russian Proceedings’). In response, Enka sought from the English
courts a declaration that Chubb Russia was bound by the subcontract’s arbitration
agreement, and an injunction restraining Chubb Russia from continuing the Russian
Proceedings. The proper law of the arbitration agreement became relevant to decide
whether injunctive relief can and should be granted against Chubb Russia.
In a judgment delivered by Popplewell, L.J. (with whom Males and Flaux,
L.JJ. concurred), the court first confirmed the views on express choice in Kabab-
Ji: it is possible to find an express choice of law for the arbitration agreement in
the terms of the main contract, as long as this results from a proper construction
of the particular terms of the main contract and arbitration clause. Crucially,
Popplewell, L.J. held that, where no express choice of law governed the main
contract, there is generally a strong presumption that the parties have impliedly
chosen the law of the seat of arbitration as the law of the arbitration agreement,
unless there were ‘powerful countervailing factors in the relationship between
the parties or the circumstances of the case’ suggesting otherwise.19 Although
both parties accepted that the subcontract was governed by Russian law, insofar
as the law of the arbitration agreement was concerned, the court found nothing
to rebut the presumption in favour of the law of the seat (i.e. English law).
18 Kabab-Ji S.A.L. (Kuwait) v. Kout Food Group (Lebanon), supra n. 14, para. 53.
19 Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi A.S. v. OOO, supra n. 4, para. 105.
LAW OF AN ARBITRATION AGREEMENT 639
Enka ruled that a choice of law in the terms of the main contract generally
cannot be relevant in ascertaining an implied choice of law for the arbitration clause
because the arbitration clause is separable from the main contract.20 This is a
remarkable volte-face from Sulamérica, where Moore-Bick, L.J. held that separability
only serves to ensure the arbitration agreement’s validity from vitiations of the
main contract and does not ‘insulate the arbitration agreement from the substantive
contract for other purposes’, 21 which was later approved in Singapore in BCY.22
Enka’s logic on separability is oddly inconsistent: if one accepts the view in
Kabab-Ji that separability does not prevent an express choice of law in the main
contract from being construed in a way that extends to the arbitration agreement,
it should in principle be equally possible to refer to the main contract when
ascertaining an implied choice of law.
Rather, Enka’s affirmation of separability’s relevance at the implied choice
stage appears designed to support the broader point that the curial law was more
likely than the main contract law to be impliedly intended as the law governing the
arbitration agreement. Since many provisions of the English Arbitration Act 1996
relating to both the parties’ procedural and substantive rights would automatically
apply to any arbitration seated in England, Popplewell, L.J. opined that the seat of
arbitration chosen by the parties has a closer connection to the arbitration agree-
ment and therefore is more indicative of the law which they most likely would
have intended to govern their arbitration agreement.23 This mirrors the arguments
advanced by Glick and Venkatesan (whom Enka cites),24 but where Popplewell, L.
J. parts ways from Glick and Venkatesan is that, according to the latter two,
separability is simply irrelevant to the entire choice of law analysis. Instead,
dépeçage (rather than separability) is the real reason why the law chosen to govern
the main contract does not ipso facto govern the arbitration agreement – that parties
may intend for different systems of law to govern different parts of a single
contract.25 On that basis, there is ‘good commercial reason’ to expect parties to
choose a different law to govern their dispute resolution clause because they seek a
neutral forum to ‘insulate the dispute resolution mechanism from the national law
of either party’.26 Consequently, according to Glick and Venkatesan, the same
20 Ibid., paras 92–95.
21 Sulamérica CIA Nacional de Seguros, supra n. 1, para. 26.
22 BCY v. BCZ [2017] 3 S.L.R. 357, para. 61.
23 Ian Glick QC & Niranjan Venkatesan, Choosing the Law Governing the Arbitration Agreement, in
Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Choice of Law in International Arbitration: Liber Amicorum Michael Pryles,
141–147 (Neil Kaplan & Michael J. Moser eds, Kluwer Law International 2018).
24 Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi A.S. v. OOO, supra n. 4, paras 69 and 93. See also FirstLink Investments Corp. Ltd.
v. GT Payment Pte. Ltd., supra n. 5, para. 13.
25 Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi A.S. v. OOO, supra n. 4, paras 136–141.
26 Ibid., para. 145.
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inference that a choice of seat should be naturally construed as a choice of law for
the arbitration agreement applies equally even where there is an express choice of
law in the main contract. Glick and Venkatesan’s reasoning has the merit of
avoiding the contradiction behind Enka’s inconsistent treatment of the separability
doctrine between the express choice and implied choice stages.
Nonetheless, it is less clear whether English law fully embraces Moore-Bick,
L.J.’s narrow conception of separability. On one hand, it is consistent with how
separability is expressed under section 7 of the English Arbitration Act 1996 and by
the House of Lords in Fiona Trust v. Privalov.27 Yet, other English authorities are
more equivocal on the issue than may first appear28: the arbitration agreement has
been described as a ‘secondary, or collateral, contract’ for resolving any disputes
arising from the parties’ primary obligations in the main contract by arbitration.29
Glick and Venkatesan’s view that the proper law of an arbitration agreement
arises as a distinct issue on the basis of parties’ intention for dépeçage misses the point
that, in the first place, separability is ultimately a legal fiction that is sustained for
the policy objective of preventing parties from impeding legal proceedings by
attacking the arbitration agreement.30 That an arbitration clause is very much part
of the main contract within which the clause resides was recognized in Singapore,
where Steven Chong, J. (as he then was), held that it ‘would be reasonable to
assume’ that contracting parties intend their entire relationship to be governed by
the choice of law clause in the main contract.31
In Kabab-Ji and Enka, the proper law of the arbitration agreement did not fall
to be decided for establishing the validity of the arbitration agreement. In contrast,
cases like Sulamérica and BNA show how provisions in the main contract, including
a choice of law clause, might potentially operate to invalidate the arbitration
agreement. Since separability is ultimately a legal fiction driven by policy concerns,
there is much to commend Coomaraswamy, J.’s suggestion in the first instance
decision of BNA. In Coomaraswamy, J.’s view, separability should apply equally in
the following manner: it should prevent a choice of law for the main contract from
being construed to govern the arbitration clause therein, where this would effec-
tively allow the parties to evade their express obligation to arbitrate at their
convenience.32
27 Fiona Trust & Holding Corp. v. Privalov [2007] Bus. L.R. 1719, para. 17. See also Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi
A.S. v. OOO, supra n. 4, para. 92.
28 Phua, supra n. 17, at 209.
29 Nigel Blackaby et al., Redfern and Hunter on International Arbitration 104 (6th ed. Oxford Univ. Press
2015).
30 Ferris v. Plaister [1994] 34 N.S.W.L.R. 474, 491.
31 BCY v. BCZ [2017] 3 S.L.R. 357, para. 59.
32 BNA v. BNB [2019] S.G.H.C. 142, paras 73–76.
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In any event, Glick and Venketasan’s reliance on dépeçage is premised on an
inference that a choice of seat, ‘whose law would govern many aspects of the
arbitration agreement’,33 should be treated as a choice of law for the arbitration
agreement. As discussed below, this might shade into a blurred distinction between
interpreting the actual intention of the parties, and imputing one to them on the
basis of presumptions.
4 PARTY AUTONOMY IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS: INTERPRETING OR IMPUTING PARTIES’
INTENTION?
More fundamentally, Enka reaches into the English toolbox for imputing intention,
finding that, as a matter of ‘commercial common sense’, one would not expect
businessmen to choose two different systems of law – the law of the seat and the law
governing the arbitration agreement – to govern their ‘arbitration package’.34
There is well-known debate on whether an implied choice is more similar to
the first stage of express choice, or the third stage involving the ‘closest connection’
test.35 Under the former view, implied choice involves inferring the parties’ actual
intention from surrounding circumstances, in the absence of any express provision.
This is the Australian position as expressed in Akai Pty Ltd. v. The People’s Insurance
Co. Ltd.,36 as well as transnational choice-of-law instruments like the Rome
Convention (a choice must be ‘express or demonstrated with reasonable
certainty’)37 and the Hague Principles on Choice of Law in International
Contracts (‘Hague Principles’) (a choice ‘must be made expressly or appear clearly
from the provisions of the contract or the circumstances’).38 In contrast, the latter
view admits the reality that such ‘inferred intention’ is often, in substance, the
result of an imputed intention which the parties had not in fact formed.
On one hand, the English courts accept that the Rome Convention’s more
stringent stance towards implied/tacit choice requires the court ‘to infer a “real” as
opposed to an imputed intention’.39 However, Enka confirms that English
33 Glick & Venkatesan, supra n. 23, at 142–143.
34 Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi A.S. v. OOO, supra n. 4, para. 99.
35 Brooke A. Marshall, Reconsidering the Proper Law of the Contract, 13 Melb. J. Int’l L. 505–539, 511–513
(2012).
36 Akai Pty. Ltd. v. The People’s Insurance Co. Ltd. (1999) 141 A.L.R. 374, 390–391.
37 Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations (19 June 1980), 80/934/EEC, Art.
3(1).
38 Hague Conference on Private International Law, Principles on Choice of Law in International
Contracts (19 Mar. 2015), Art. 4; see Commentary on the Principles on Choice of Law in International
Contracts, para. 4.6.
39 Lawlor v. Sandvik Mining & Construction Mobile Crushers & Screens Ltd. [2013] EWCA Civ 365, paras
26–29; Peter Nygh, Autonomy in International Contracts 110 (Clarendon Press 1999).
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common law appears generally inclined towards the latter view permitting judicial
imputation.40 In particular, Kabab-Ji’s incorporation of English contract law’s
business efficacy test for implying a contractual term in fact allows the court to
fill a contractual gap by imputing what the parties may be presumed to have
intended regarding an issue to which they did not address their minds at the time
of agreement.41 In short, judicial imputation has been artificially characterized as an
implied choice made by parties.42
In contrast, BNA suggests that an implied choice of proper law still involves
the parties’ actual intention, determined by ‘a process of construction which
critically gives the words of the arbitration agreement their natural meaning, unless
there are sufficient contrary indicia to displace that reading’.43 It is only at the third
stage of the analysis where the court may take ‘the extraordinary step of imputing a
choice of proper law’ on the basis that the law with the closest and most real
connection with the arbitration agreement would have been selected by the parties
if they had considered the issue at the time of agreement.44 This arguably better
preserves the distinction between interpreting the parties’ true intentions and
imputing their presumed intentions.
The more critical point is that this is consistent with the New York
Convention, which obliges Member States under Article V(1)(a) to apply the
law of the seat as the law governing the arbitration agreement, unless the parties
have ‘subjected’ the arbitration agreement to a particular law (whether expressly or
impliedly).
To the extent that some commentators such as Born have argued that Articles II
and V(1)(a) of the New York Convention oblige contracting states to apply a pro-
validation approach to always effectuate the parties’ intention to arbitrate,45 that is
doubtful. The language used in those provisions is hardly unequivocal, nor does the
travaux demonstrate that the drafters had contemplated this specific issue. A pro-
validation approach is arguably inconsistent with the express provision for the law of
the seat as the default governing law in the absence of party choice contained in
Article V(1)(a): even if the parties had included an arbitration clause in their main
contract, the fact remains that they may not have reached any agreement on the
proper law of the arbitration clause, in which case contracting states to the New
York Convention are obliged to apply the law of the seat, rather than imputing an
agreement to the parties. More critically, the validation principle would have
40 Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi A.S. v. OOO, supra n. 4, para. 70.
41 Sembcorp Marine Ltd. v. PPL Holdings Pte. Ltd. [2013] 4 S.L.R. 193, paras 93–101;Marks & Spencer plc v.
BNP Paribas Securities Services Trust Company (Jersey) Ltd. [2015] UKSC 72, paras 21–30.
42 Compare Sulamérica CIA Nacional de Seguros, supra n. 1, para. 57.
43 BNA v. BNB [2019] S.G.C.A. 84, para. 104.
44 Ibid., para. 48, approving BNA v. BNB [2019] S.G.H.C. 148, para. 56, per Coomaraswamy, J.
45 Born, supra n. 13, at 834–837.
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nothing to say about whether a party has agreed to be bound by the arbitration
agreement (as in Kabab-Ji), or whether a party has breached the arbitration agreement
(as in Enka), because the principle is engaged only where the issue concerns the
validity of the arbitration agreement. Even then, it begs the question of whose
yardstick should be applied to ascertain the validity of the arbitration agreement in
the first place, since different laws will yield different answers to the same set of
facts.46 As the parties’ actual, rather than imputed, intent should take centre stage, it
could make good sense to prefer BNA’s approach of taking into account the
invalidating effect of a particular governing law on the arbitration agreement only
where the parties were aware of that fact at the time of agreement.
Nevertheless, this distinction between implication and imputation becomes
murky when one considers both the Singapore and English courts’ reliance on
inferences or presumptions of implied choice, whether in favour of the law of the
main contract or the law of the seat. A presumption of choice rebuttable by actual
evidence of choice of another system of law effectively circumscribes the possibility
that the parties have simply not contemplated the issue of proper law of the
arbitration agreement at all (which should not be surprising given their character-
ization as ‘midnight clauses’ which are often neglected).47 The same logic applies
to Glick and Venkatesan’s argument that a choice of seat should be ordinarily taken
to infer a choice of law for the arbitration agreement.48 A possible assessment of the
circumstances in BNA might be that the parties had simply failed to consider
specifically which law should govern their arbitration agreement, which would still
have led the court to apply PRC law, except on the different basis that it had the
closest and most real connection with the arbitration agreement.49 Put simply, a
presumption of implied choice wades dangerously close to the shores of imputed
intention and risks undermining the default choice-of-law rule that applies in the
absence of actual party choice. Indeed, Neuberger, M.R., in his concurring
judgment in Sulamérica, provides a useful reminder that it may be necessary to
cut right through the feverish contest between the law governing the main
contract and the law of the seat, and instead:
accept that there are sound reasons to support either conclusion as a matter of principle.
Whichever course is adopted, it is necessary to consider whether there is anything in the
other provisions of the contract or the surrounding circumstances which assist in resolving
the conundrum.50
46 See the conflicting judgments between the English and French courts in both the Dallah v. Pakistan and
Kabab-Ji S.A.L. v. Kout Food Group litigations, as discussed infra at Part V.
47 Blackaby et al., supra n. 29, at 72–73.
48 Glick & Venkatesan, supra n. 23, at 143.
49 Sulamérica CIA Nacional de Seguros, supra n. 1, paras 31–32.
50 Ibid., para. 61.
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It is suggested here that a better route which truly respects the primacy of
party autonomy would be to eschew the use of presumptions, and refrain from
arrogating to ourselves whatever ‘commercial’ sensibilities businessmen may have
to justify those presumptions.51 Fundamentally, parties are allowed to make an
express choice of law governing the arbitration agreement, whether expressed
through the clauses of the main contract (such as Kabab-Ji), in the arbitration
clause, or indeed in a separate free-standing agreement. In the absence of an
express choice, one turns to look for an implied choice.
In relation to implied choice, resorting to domestic concepts for implication of
terms that exist under the lex fori as Kabab-Ji would have us do is not ideal, not least
because international tribunals who have to grapple with the same issue do not
have the luxury of a lex fori. Instead, following the Hague Principles, parties can
make an implied choice of law ascertained through the main contract or the
circumstances of the case, but there must be a clear and real intention by both
parties that a certain law shall be applicable. A presumed intention imputed to the
parties should not suffice.
For instance, in Arsanovia v. Cruz City, besides the main contract’s express
stipulation that ‘this agreement’ was governed by Indian law, the arbitration clause
expressly excluded certain provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act.52 One can
easily appreciate why the English court held that Indian law (less the excluded
provisions) governed the arbitration agreement, without resorting to the use of
presumptions. Conversely, the fact that a governing law candidate may invalidate
the arbitration agreement is a negative indication of intention – that the parties
probably did not intend to choose that law – but critically it would not conclu-
sively establish per se a positive intention to choose a particular governing law
candidate (cf. an in favorem validitatis rule of construction).53
Short of sufficient evidence to establish that the parties had a clear and real
intent to choose a proper law for the arbitration agreement, courts at least in New
York Convention contracting states should apply the default rule under Article V
(1)(a), i.e. the law of the seat. This approach would achieve the same result reached
in Sulamérica, BNA, and Enka, preserve harmony between common law choice of
law rules and the choice of law rules embodied in the New York Convention,
arrive at a common set of choice of law rules that both courts and international
51 See e.g. Pacific Recreation Pte. Ltd. v. S. Y. Technology Inc. [2008] 2 s. L.R.(R.) 491, para. 47; Myron
Phua, Resolving the Difficulties of Determining What Law Governs the Validity of an Arbitration
Agreement – A Critique Erga Omnes, 28 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 335–366, 360–363 (2017).
52 Arsanovia Ltd. v. Cruz City 1 Mauritius Holdings [2012] EWHC 3702 (Comm), para. 20.
53 Phua, supra n. 51, at 357–360; Victor Leong & Tan Jun Hong, The Law Governing Arbitration
Agreements: BCY v. BCZ and Beyond, 30 SAcLJ 70–96, 95 (2018).
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arbitrators alike can apply, and avoid distortions caused by judicially imputing
intentions when there might be none.
5 ‘PRO-ARBITRATION’ POLICY IN THE CHOICE OF LAW
ANALYSIS?
Practically, leaving aside fine doctrinal schisms over choice of law rules, insofar as
litigation strategy is concerned, the trend of modern English authorities (including
Sulamérica, Kabab-Ji, and Enka)54 have ultimately displayed a pattern in favour of
English law governing the arbitration agreement, except in the clearest of indica-
tions otherwise as in Arsanovia. A similar forum preference approach in the English
courts has also been observed in the context of determining the parties’ choice of
the seat of arbitration.55
On that basis, it may be interesting to understand the case law against the policy
objectives that would be served by its finding on the proper law of the arbitration
agreement. In holding that English law applies to the arbitration agreement, Kabab-Ji
may have sought to skirt the same controversy engaged during the Dallah v. Pakistan56
litigation concerning how an English court would decide whether French law con-
siders a non-signatory to be bound to an arbitration agreement.57 Indeed, this potential
conundrum materialized. After Kabab-Ji was decided by the English Court of Appeal,
the seat court in Paris held that the arbitration agreement was governed by French law,
and applying French law, the non-signatory respondent in question was a proper party
to the arbitration agreement. In so doing, it arrived at the opposite conclusion from
the English Court of Appeal.58 Like in Dallah, the conflicting decisions resulted in an
award that was enforceable at the seat in France, but not in England. As for Sulamérica
and Enka, these two decisions could represent the English courts’ readiness to issue an
injunction restraining foreign proceedings in breach of a London-seated arbitration
agreement59 as a matter of protecting the country’s reputation as an arbitral seat.
Indeed, the UK Supreme Court previously hinted at this policy consideration in the
course of affirming the English courts’ inherent jurisdiction to grant injunctive
54 See also C. v. D. [2007] EWCA Civ 1282; Habas Sinai Ve Tibbi Gazlar Istihsal Endustrisi A.S. v. VSC
Steel Co. Ltd. [2013] EWHC 4071 (Comm).
55 Jonathan Hill, Determining the Seat of an International Arbitration: Party Autonomy and The Interpretation of
Arbitration Agreements, 63 ICLQ 517–534, 534 (2014).
56 Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co. v. Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Government of Pakistan
[2011] 1 A.C. 763.
57 See Jacob Grierson & Mireille Taok, Dallah: Conflicting Judgments from the UK Supreme Court and the
Paris Cour d’Appel, 28 J. Int’l Arb. 407–422 (2011).
58 Cour d’appel, Paris, 23 June 2020.
59 Note that this includes both foreign court proceedings pursuing a substantive claim in breach of an
agreement to arbitrate (e.g. in Enka), and foreign proceedings pursuing procedural remedies such as an
anti-arbitration injunction in the face of a valid agreement to arbitrate (e.g. in Sulamérica).
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relief – that it would otherwise be ‘a radical diminution of the protection afforded by
English law to parties to such an arbitration agreement’.60
Unlike in England, Singapore has not yet revealed any similar inclination
towards forum preference – BNA and BCY are prime examples, where foreign law
was applied as the law governing the arbitration agreement.
Whilst there may be some immediate attraction to applying a governing law
which would ensure the validity of an arbitration agreement, any so-called pro-
validation approach would in reality be motivated by a state sending a policy signal
that it will refer parties to arbitration as long as parties have included an arbitration
clause in their contract.
Even then, that can only be half the story: is it ultimately better for the arbitral
system by always applying a validating proper law of the arbitration agreement, or
to ensure that the parties can get an enforceable award at the end of the day? If
tribunals are allowed to affirm their own jurisdiction by finding that the arbitration
agreement is always governed by a law under which the agreement is valid, any
eventual award may well be refused enforcement in another forum when the
enforcing court applies a different governing law to the arbitration agreement. This
may explain the decision in BNA: if the tribunal’s jurisdiction was affirmed, the
award creditor would have likely faced an uphill battle in enforcing the award in
the PRC courts, which could conceivably take a less generous position given PRC
law’s current restrictions on foreign arbitration institution-administered arbitration
agreements. The same argument holds true from the perspective of the enforcing
court – as the Kabab-Ji litigation demonstrates, an arbitral award may be refused
enforcement outside the seat of arbitration, despite being fully capable of enforce-
ment at the seat.
6 CONCLUSION
As Enka is scheduled to be heard on appeal by the UK Supreme Court, the English
Court of Appeal’s approach in Enka will surely not be the last word. A close
examination of the case law (as at the time of writing) on determining the proper
law of an arbitration agreement reveals a strong tension between the need to give
effect to party autonomy on choice of law, on one hand, and broader policies
regarding the regulation and promotion of arbitration which are especially acute in
major arbitration centres, such as England and Singapore.
To this end, rather than a reliance on presumptions or inferences or a principle
of validation, what may be ultimately beneficial for the entire arbitral system is for
60 AES Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant LLP v. Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant JSC [2013] 1 W.L.R.
1889, para. 58.
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tribunals and state signatories to the New York Convention to hew to the choice
of law rules under Article V(1)(a) of the Convention to ascertain the governing law
of an arbitration agreement, and apply those rules in the manner described above:
short of sufficient evidence to establish that the parties had a clear and real intent to
choose a proper law for the arbitration agreement, tribunals and courts should
apply the default rule of the law of the seat.
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